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In this issue of EMBO reports, Yvette Pearson questions 
my argument that reproductive cloning violates our moral 
values (Pearson, 2006), which I described in my own 
Viewpoint earlier this year (Tannert, 2006). Although 
I appreciate Pearson’s engagement in this debate, I feel 
obliged to respond to some of her criticisms.
First, she alleges that I appeal to genetic determinism. 
Quite the opposite is true, as can be inferred both from 
the context of my article and from my quote about 
natural monozygotic twins: „...although they are largely 
identical internally and externally, they are not perfect 
copies of each other. During their lives—starting from 
the separation of the first two cells to their development 
in the uterus and eventually to their death—random 
processes and mutations further shape their individual 
history and ontogenesis and leave their imprint from 
conception on, even in their genomes“ (Tannert, 2006).
Of course, individuals are not the mere sum of their 
genes and I have argued against this ill-advised idea of 
a mechanistic determinism in biology for more than 40 
years. But I have also fought the similarly foolish idea, 
most notably re-animated in the 1950s in the Soviet 
Union and inspired by Stalin himself (Soyfer, 1994), that 
an individual is only shaped by its physical and social 
environment. There is no doubt that genes fundamentally 
determine how an organism develops. But we do not yet 
know how strongly genes and/or the biological and social 
environment influence this development. Genes define 
us as a species, and they clearly contribute to defining us 
as individuals.
On the basis of another quote from my article, Pearson 
suggests that I regard only cloned beings as artefacts. 
Again, this is not true. In my view, any assisted reproductive 
technology starts with the creation of an artefact, a 
product of human art and technology. Accordingly, there 
are reasons to regard in vitro fertilization per se as ethically 
reprehensible—or at the very least, questionable—owing 
to ethical problems, but there are also arguments to think 
otherwise. Lacking space, I will not delve further into this 
debate.
However, we do not need any arguments over genetic 
determinism and the ethics of artificial reproduction—as 
well as a putative „right to a unique genotype“ (Brock, 
1998; Pearson, 2006)—to formulate an ethical argument 
against reproductive cloning on the basis of Kant‘s 
axiom of human autonomy. Instead, the core argument 
is that any constriction of human autonomy that is 
arbitrary, avoidable and not necessary to ensure the basic 
requirements for an individual‘s survival, intervenes 
in the autonomy of that individual and is therefore 
reprehensible for moral reasons. Consequently, any 
such biological, pedagogical and even socioeconomical 
interventions should be avoided if we regard human 
autonomy as a constitutional right. There are, of course, 
necessary constraints of autonomy, for example when 
parents educate their children. Similarly, a couple 
conceiving a child also limit its autonomy in the sense 
that they provide their genetic material—whether the 
reason for having a child is narcissistic or not. However, 
to pursue reproductive cloning and therefore impose 
one’s genome—for whatever selfish reasons—on another 
human is arbitrary, unnecessary for the well-being of 
the clone and an avoidable constraint of the clone’s 
autonomy. This alone is the leading moral principle of 
my argument.
It is a principle, not a law. Regarding logistical cloning—
an unfortunate term in my view—which Pearson cites 
as an argument to allow reproductive cloning if there 
is no other means to have a genetically related child, 
it would indeed be alarming if we invalidated a moral 
principle to that end. Just because the means exist does 
not automatically grant the right to use them. When 
weighing the strengths of moral arguments, the right 
to have a genetically related offspring „to carry on the 
family line“ (Pearson, 2006) must therefore be secondary. 
The American bioethicist Arthur Caplan, when talking 
about reproductive technologies, put it this way: „You 
have to step in and try to make sure that reproductive 
technology ...is not just the Wild West“. He continued: 
„If you‘re going to make babies in new and unusual ways, 
then you have to protect the kid‘s interests, and they‘re 
not protected if all you‘re listening to is what the paying 
customer wants“ (Caplan, 2006).
Turning to my last point: whether we can allow the 
creation of a child, by whatever means, as a donor of 
immunocompatible cells for a diseased relative, is an 
ethically borderline case. If such a ‚saviour sibling‘ is born 
primarily for its own sake, then, and only then, might 
we allow its procreation for the secondary purpose of 
healing another child. Notwithstanding such arguments, 
the basic moral principle is: Thou shalt not clone!
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